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NOTES
SUBSTITUTION OF ALTERNATE JURORS
DURING DELIBERATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF
LITIGANTS: THE REGINALD DENNY
TRIAL
INTRODUCTION
Historically, when faced with the situation of an incapacitated or
disqualified juror, courts discharged that juror and declared a mistrial)
This practice necessitated the substantial expenditure of prosecution,
defense and court resources. 2 The emergence of longer, more complex
trials,' in which jurors are more susceptible to incapacitation or dis-
qualification, exacerbated the problem.' As Chief Justice Burger pointed
out, "even Jefferson would be appalled at the prospect of a dozen of
his yeomen and artisans trying to cope with some of today's complex
litigation in trials lasting many weeks or months." In an attempt to
address this problem, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) per-
See, e.g., People v. Peete, 2{}2 P. 51, 65 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921); People v. Curran, 121 N.E.
637, 638 (111. 1918).
2 See Fr.D. R. GRIM. P. 23 (b) Advisory Committee's Note, 97 F.R.D. 245 (1983). This committee
was very concerned with the expenditure of resources when a juror is discharged after a lengthy
trial. Id. at 298.
3 See Chief justice Warren E. Burger, Can furies Cope with Multi-Month Thais?, 3 AM.J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 449, 449-52 (1980). Although Chief justice Burger mainly criticizes the use of juries in
protracted civil cases, he establishes that modern trials are becoming longer and increasing the
burden on jurors. Id. at 450-52.
4 See Barry E. Ungar & Theodore R. Mann, The Jury and the Complex Civil Came, 6 Lyra:. 3,
4 (1980). The authors point out the susceptibilities of a jury in a protracted trial. See id. Citing
statistics from the U.S. Statistical Abstract, they write that in a two-year period, out of eighteen
persons, three will die or lose a spouse, parent or child; two will lose a sibling; one will give birth;
six will be admitted to a hospital; and at least two will move to another county. Id. Additionally,
the authors note, the predomination of older, retired individuals on juries and the numerous
business and personal reasons that cause jurors to withdraw, demonstrate the problem with using
juries in lengthy trials. Id,
5 Burger, .supra note 3, at 451.
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mits the replacement of a juror before the commencement of delib-
erations.6
 Once deliberations begin, however, Rule 24(c) requires courts
to discharge any remaining alternates.' Thus, the possibility of a costly
mistrial still exists in the federal system. 8
 In response to the recurring
possibility of mistrial, some courts have implemented their own proce-
dures and permitted the post-submission substitution of alternates. 9
In contrast to Rule 24(c), the California legislature explicitly au-
thorized the post-submission substitution of alternates in section 1089
of the California Penal Code.'° As originally enacted, the California
statute mirrored Rule 24(c) and only permitted the substitution of
alternate jurors before deliberations." Amending the original statute
in 1933, the California legislature expanded the trial court's power in
an effort to enhance judicial economy while preserving the rights of
the accused.' 2
6 See FED. R. CRIM, P. 24(c). This rule provides in relevant part:
The court may direct that not more than 6 jurors in addition to the regular jury
be called and empanelled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in
which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to
consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform
their duties. .. . An alternate who does not replace a regular juror shall be dis-
charged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.
Id. Rule 23(b) also allows a limited solution to this problem, permitting district court judges to
discharge one of the twelve jurors and proceed with only eleven jurors. FED. R. Clued. P. 23(b)
7 FED. R. CRIM, P. 24(c).
8 See, e.g.. United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 EN 418, 419 (5th Cir. 1992) (court discovered
juror's hearing impediment after deliberations had begun); United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2(1 1153,
1155 (9th Cir. 1975) (court informed after start of deliberations that one juror was unable to
continue due to death of dose friend); Leser v. United States, 358 E2d 313, 314-15 (9th Cir.
1966) (court informed that juror was unable to continue deliberations due to important medical
appointment), cert. dismissed 385 U.S. 802 (1966).
9 E.g., Quiraz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at 420 (post-submission substitution allowed where defendant
suffered no prejudice); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 996 (5th Cir. 1981) (post-submis-
sion substitution allowed due to length and complexity of trial and absence of prejudice), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); Leser, 358 F.2d at 317 (post-submission substitution allowed where
defendants consented).
1° Cm.. PENAL Cont.  § 1089 (West 1985). This statute provides, in relevant part:
If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury,
a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found
to be unable to perform his duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause
appears therefor, the court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of
an alternate, who shall then take his place in the jury box, and be subject to the
same rules and regulations as though he had been selected as one of the original
jurors.
Id.
II See People v. Aikens, 254 Cal. Rptr. 30, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
12 See id. at 31-33. The court balanced the constitutional rights of the accused against the
consequences which result from granting mistrials and prolonging criminal proceedings. Id. at
33.
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Concerns over the fairness of section 1089's application surfaced
in the well-publicized trial of Damian Williams and Henry Watson, the
two men accused of beating truck driver Reginald Denny during the
Los Angeles riots of 1992.' 3 During the trial, Superior Court Judge John
Ouderkirk replaced five jurors from the original panel of twelve with
alternates, and two of these replacements occurred after the start of
deliberations." While four of these substitutions appeared to be clearly
within the judge's statutorily authorized discretion, the removal of
juror 373 sparked controversy)" Judge Ouderkirk replaced juror 373
for failing to deliberate after the other jurors accused her of lacking
the mental capacity to contribute meaningfully to any discussions)"
This Note argues that Judge Ouderkirk's decision to replace juror
373 directly affected the defendants' rights, and more broadly, contra-
vened a fundamental principle on which our jury system is based, that
of free and uncoerced deliberation. Part I of this Note discusses the
historical underpinnings of the jury system and the importance of the
deliberation process) 7 Part II discusses post-submission substitution in
the federal courts. 18 Part Ill reviews the California statute and relevant
case law concerning the substitution of alternate jurors during delib-
erations.' 9 Part IV examines in detail the Denny trial and specifically
Judge Ouderkirk's decision to replace juror 373 with an alternate. 2"
Finally, Part V argues that because post-submission juror substitution
potentially infringes on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
free and impartial jury, its use should be carefully restricted and strictly
reviewed.'
I. JURIES —A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Reverence for the American jury dates back to the Founding
Fathers, who firmly believed that the jury system was, at the minimum,
a safeguard of liberty, and at the maximum, the "very palladium of free
13 ,Seri David A. Kaplan &	 Pryor, Disorder in the Court, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1993, at 32.
The authors state that Judge Ouderkirk's controversial decision to remove juror No. 373 could
be reversed on appeal. Id.
"Ashley Dunn & Penelope MeMillanjury 's Ordeal: 2 Harrowing Weeks, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1993, at Al, A29.
15 See Kaplan & Pryor, supra note 13, at 32.
"'Transcript at 8152, 8212, People v. Williams, No. BA058116 (L.A. Super. Ct. 1993).
17 See infra notes 22-50 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 51-142 and accompanying text.
•See infra notes 143-239 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes '240-335 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 336-71 and accompanying text.
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government."" Many commentators share this view, noting that the
jury system is fundamental to the ongoing health of a democracy. 23
Supporters of the jury system, throughout history, maintained that trial
by jury was the "most effective weapon in democracy's arsenal to
combat the tyranny that cannot emerge until it has effectively overrid-
den the right of the individual to raise his voice, first in the legislature
and then in the courtroom.""
Scholars also praise the United States' commitment to the use of
ordinary individuals in the administration of justice through the use
of the common citizen on the jury. 25 Labeling the jury a "remarkable
political institution," one commentator praises the practice of recruit-
ing twelve individuals chosen at random, bringing them together for
the purpose of a trial, and entrusting them with the power of deci-
sion. 26
 This commentator notes that unlike systems focused on the use
of professional, experienced judges to determine final judgments, the
jury is an exciting experiment in human affairs.!?
From its inception, the jury comprised of ordinary citizens has
been the subject of ongoing controversy, attracting sharp criticism in
addition to extravagant praise. 28 Critics focus on the wisdom of hap-
hazardly choosing amateurs from the street to render such crucial
decisions, citing the inherent danger in choosing a body of people
from the population at random." In light of these criticisms of the use
22
 BERNARD BOTEIN & MURRAY A. GORDON. THE TRIAL OF THE FUTURE 100 (1963). Patrick
Henry hoped that Americans would never part with what he considered to be an astonishing and
excellent mode of trial. Philip H. Corboy, The Right To Dial By Jury, 4 Am. I. TRIAL ADVOC, 65,
68 (1980).
25 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284-85 (1985 ed.). De Tocutimille
states:
The jury teaches every man not to recoil before the responsibility of his own actions
and impresses hint with the manly confidence without which no political virtue can
exist. It invests in each citizen a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties
which they are bound to discharge towards society and the part which they take in
its government.
Id. Blackstone described the trial by jury as the "glory of English Law . . . . [Tihe liberties of
England cannot but subsist as long as this palladium remains sacred and inviolate." Corboy, supra
note 22, at 67.
24 BOTEIN 8c GORDON, supra note 22, at 115.
25
 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 1 (1966).
26
27 Id. at 1-2. Another commentator holds an even stronger opinion on the subject, criticizing
judges' abilities as fact-finders: "I submit that the least reliable fact finder is that imperious,
arrogant, impatient, irritable yet experienced specialist who has analyzed the same problem
hundreds of times." Corboy, supra note 22, at 68.
"KAINEN & ZEISEL, supra note 25, at 4. The authors point out that most of the debate
concerning juries is limited to the civil context and that the reasons underlying the use of juries
in criminal trials are much stronger. at 9.
29 See id. at 6. The authors quote English scholar Glanville Williams, who questions the
July 1994]	 ALDETWATE SUBS'ITIVTIONS 	 851
of the jury in civil cases, many continue to support the use of juries in
the criminal context.'"
In criminal cases, juries act as a "bulwark against oppression,"
according to former Chief Justice Warren Burger."' By bringing to-
gether representative cross-sections of the community and their aggre-
gate common sense judgment, the process promotes accurate and
reliable findings of fact." The United Suites Supreme Court noted, in
the 1967 case of Duncan v. Louisiana, that the use of ordinary laymen
to determine guilt or innocence provides a safeguard against corrupt
or overzealous prosecutors and against biased or eccentric judges."
The Duncan Court also pointed out that the creation of juries in
federal and state constitutions demonstrated the reluctance of the
framers to entrust powers over the fundamental rights of citizens to
one judge." Community participation in the verdicts of those standing
trial, concluded the Court, helps ensure protection against govern-
ment oppression."
Central to the proper functioning of our jury system is the delib-
eration process.'" To deliberate is "to ponder or think about with
measured careful consideration and often with formal discussion be-
fore reaching a decision or conclusion."' In the context of the Ameri-
practice of randomly choosing individuals to sit on juries. hi. This system is problematic, accord-
ing to Williams, because many of the best qualified individuals the arc exempted. Id. The resulting
jury may be "unusually ignorant, credulous, slow-witted, narrow-minded, biased or tempermen-
tal," KALVAN & ZE1SEL, supra note 25, at 6.
3° See, e.g., id. at 9; Burger, supra note 3, at 451,
SI Burger, supra note 3, at 451.
n See RKID 11AsTir. icr AL., INSIIJE Intr, Juav 5 (1983).
"Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1967); see also Corboy, supra note 22, at 68-69
(criticizing judges' fact-finding abilities, pointing out that repetition does not improve ability to
accurately assess fiuus).
34 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
55 See id. at 156.
n Damp: icr AL., supra note 32, at 5; see Tanner v. United States, 483 U,S. 107, 127 (1987)
(affirming district court's denial of post-verdict evidentiary hearing to determine if jury members
consumed alcohol and drugs during trial); see also Fen. R. Even. 606(b) which states in relevant
part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indicunent, a juror may not testify
as to any matter or statement. occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations
or to the effect. of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing him to assent to or dissent front the verdict or indictment or concerning
his mental processes in connection therewith, except that at juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to
bear upon any juror,
"Transcript at 8159, People v. Williams, No. BA058116 (L.A. Super. Ct. 1993). The judge




BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 35:847
can judicial system, deliberation is the procedure where the jury, ana-
lyzing information within the secrecy of the jury room, discusses and
weighs the evidence presented in an effort to reach a verdict based on
the law applicable to the facts." This popular notion of jury delibera-
tion surfaced in early case law. 39 In 1873, in Railroad Co. v. Stout, the
United States Supreme Court described deliberation as a process where
twelve individuals come together, debate, apply their real world expe-
riences to the problem at hand, and eventually arrive at a unanimous
determination.40 Both courts and social scientists agree that the free
and uncoerced contributions of all jurors are likely to overcome any
biases harbored by individual jurors, thus resulting in more accurate
and objective determinations of fact.'" To encourage the unfettered
contributions of all jurors, both courts and the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence vehemently protect the secrecy surrounding the
deliberation process."
Members of both the legal and social science communities also
note the importance of group dynamics in the deliberation process.°
Research demonstrates that many factors aside from the evidence play
an integral role in verdict determinations." Social scientists have dis-
covered that juror age, gender and social class are among a variety of
factors that influence the deliberation process.° These demographics
affect the way jurors handle themselves individually, and the way they
interact in the effort to render a verdict. 46 Certain courts have noted
that the importance of group dynamics is further illustrated when an
alternate juror enters deliberations after the original jury has deliber-
ated for some time. 47 Supporting this view, studies indicate that new-
sa
	 at 8159.
39 See Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873).
40
41 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1977); HAsTrE EX AL., supra note 32, at 5.
42 See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (affirming district court's decision
to deny post-verdict evidentiary hearing to determine if members of jury consumed alcohol and
drugs during trial). Others have observed that the secrecy surrounding jury deliberations is in-
tentional and serves, in part, to encourage the sharing of information. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER
& LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: 'FP:XI', CASES & PROBLEMS 12 (1988).
The Federal Rules of Evidence also place substantial limitations on any post•verdict inquiry
conducted by the court. See FED. R. EVID, 606.
45 SiIi? United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Collins, 552 P.2d
742, 746 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977); James Davis et al., The Empirical Study of
Decision Processes in juries: A Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL. AND LEGAL. ISSUES 341-351. (j. Louie Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977).
44 See FlAyriE ET AL., supra note 32, at 119; Davis et al., supra note 43, at 341-51.
45 HAFritt rr AL., supra note 32, at 121.
46 M
47 See Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156; Collins, 552 P.2d at 746.
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corners to a group encounter substantial opposition when trying to
change the practices and beliefs of an established body," and in some
cases, the newcomer erroneously accepts the false, yet preconceived
ideas of the group." Thus, some courts and commentators criticize the
practice of post-submission juror substitution, questioning the alter-
nate's ability to fully and effectively participate in deliberations.'"
II. POST-SUBMISSION SUBSTITUTION BY FEDERAL COURTS: FEDERAL
RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 24(c) Ami ITS LIMITED EXCEPTIONS
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) explicitly permits sub-
stitutions of alternate jurors prior to the start of jury deliberations."'
However, Rule 24(c) mandates the discharge of any alternate juror who
has not been substituted before the jury retires into deliberations. 52
Thus, Rule 24(c) prohibits alternate substitutions of jurors during
deliberations. 53 The committee charged with formulating Rule 24(c)
considered the possibility of post-submission substitution." It rejected
this notion, however, because the United States Supreme Court ques-
tioned the constitutionality and desirability of such a practice."' Despite
a subsequent Judicial Conference Committee recommendation to amend
Rule 24(c) to allow the substitution of alternate jurors during delib-
erations,'" the rule remains unchanged." Citing the coercive effects
upon an alternate joining a jury which, for all intents and purposes,
has already determined the outcome of the deliberations, the Ameri-
can Bar Association, in 1974, supported Rule 24(c)'s prohibition of
post-submission substitution. 58 Despite the unambiguous language of
48 Joshua G. Grunat, Note, Post-Submission Substitution of Alternate Jurors in Federal Cthninal
Cases: Effects of Violations of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b) and 29(c), 55 FoRmum L.
REV. 861, 878-79 n.125 (1987).
48 Id. at 878 n.124.
"See Lamb. 529 F.2d at 1156, Collins, 552 P,2c1 at 746.
51 FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c).
52 Id.
53 See id.
51 United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 993 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136
(1982).
55 See id.; Lester B. Orfield, Trial jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 46 (1961).
58 37 F.R.D. 71, 74 (1965). Citing the California Penal Code section that permits post-delib-
eration substitution, this committee believed that there was a need to allow post-submission
substitution in the federal courts. Id. They commented that the need for amendment was greater
in the criminal context. Id.
57 Fxn. R. Clam. P. 24(c). The practice of prohibiting post-submission juror substitution has
gained the support of one prestigious commentator, Professor Charles Wright. See Lamb, 529 F.2d
at 1156. Wright concludes that any violation of Rule 24 (c) 's requirements should result in reversal,
regardless of whether the defendant consented to such a procedure. id.
58 M. at 1156 n.5.
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Rule 24(c), however, some federal circuits have endorsed procedures
which allow for alternate substitution during deliberations. 59
Federal case law indicates that alternate substitution is clearly
permissible before the start of deliberations. 6° Citing the language in
Rule 24(c) which allows the replacement of a juror before delibera-
dons when that juror becomes "unable or disqualified to perform [his
or her] duties," courts have replaced jurors for a number of reasons,
including juror bias and tardiness.'" In 1950, in Gillars v. United States,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the district court judge acted properly in replacing a juror who
misrepresented herself during voir dire. 62 During voir dire, the juror
failed to respond truthfully to a question concerning her personal
opposition to the death penalty.° The juror advised the district court
of this fact after the jury was sworn but before the commencement of
opening statements." The Gillars court noted that the plain language
of Rule 24(c) gives the district court judge the authority to replace any
juror who, prior to deliberations, is unable or disqualified to perform
their duties.° The disclosure of her true feelings concerning the death
penalty, concluded the court, disqualified this juror and made the
alternate substitution proper. 66 The court indicated that the fact that
the jury had been sworn was irrelevant, and that the substitution was
timely because it was effectuated before the start of cieliberations. 67
Thus, the Gillars court, relying on the plain language of Rule 24(c),
endorsed alternate substitutions which occurred prior to delibera-
tions.68
Over the past twenty-five years, a trend in favor of post-submission
juror substitution in limited circumstances has emerged in some cir-
" E.g., United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1992) (allowing post-sub-
mission substitution where defendant suffered no prejudice); Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d
313, 317 (9th Cir.) (allowing post-submission substitution of alternate jurors where defendants
consented), cert. dismissed, 385 U.S. 802 (1966).
60 See, e.g., United States V. Floyd, 496 F.2d 982, 990 (2d Cir.) (affirming trial court's decision
to replace juror during trial when it became known that juror had prejudice which would prevent
him from rendering fair decision), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); Gillars v. United States, 182
F.2(1962, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (affirming trial court's replacement of juror with an alternate when
it became known to the court that juror failed to disclose bias that would prevent her from
rendering fair decision).
61 Floyd 496 F.2d at 990 (replacing juror for bias); United States v. Domeitech, 476 F.2d 1229,
1232 (2d Cir.) (replacing juror for tardiness), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973).
Gillars, 182 F.2d at 980.
61
64 Id.
65 Id.; see Fan. R. CRIM. P. 24(c).
66 Gillars, 182 F.2d at 980.
Id. at 980.-81.
68 See id. at 980.
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cuits."" The first court that circumvented the mandatory language of
Rule 24(c) based its decision on the consent of the parties involved."
Another court endorsed post-submission substitutions only in excep-
tional circumstances. 71 Finally, other courts have allowed the practice
of alternate substitutions during deliberations as long as the defendant
has suffered no prejudice. 72 While constantly reaffirming the manda-
tory nature of Rule 24(c)'s language, these courts have nonetheless
managed to carve out limited exceptions to this rule."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in the
1966 case of Leser v. United States, permitted the post-submission sub-
stitution of a juror because defense counsel consented to the move in
the presence of the defendants. 74 The day before deliberations began,
one of the jurors informed the district court that he had an appoint-
ment the following day for an important medical procedure." The
district court judge suggested that both parties stipulate that the alter-
nates not be discharged at the outset of deliberations, but instead
remain in attendance and available until after the verdict." Both sides
agreed and the district court substituted one of the alternates the next
day.77 The jury returned with a guilty verdict approximately four hours
later." The Ninth Circuit found the post-submission substitution per-
missible in light of the defendants' voluntary stipulation to the proce-
dure:7° The knowing and intelligent nature of their consent, explained
the court, bound the defendants to accept the verdicts as rendered."
In the absence of prejudice, the Leser court construed Rule 24(c) to
allow post-submission substitution if the defendants knowingly and
intelligently consented to the procedure.' { '
611 See, e.g., United States v. Quiroz-Corter, 960 F.2d 41H, 420 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Hayntin, 398 F.2d 944,950 (2d CM), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968); User, 358 F.2d at 317-18.
7() Lever, 358 F.2d at 317.
11 Phillips, 664 F.2d at 996.
Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at 420-21; llaytttin, 388 F.241 at 950.
78 See, e.g., Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at 420; Phillips, 694 F.2d at 994; Ilayutin, 388 F.2d at 950.
74 358 R2r1 at 317.
75 Id. at 314.
76 Id. at 315. The. judge was carefill in his wording to ensure t hat both sides understood that
any stipulations were purely voluntary. See id.
" Id. at 315-16,
Leser, 358 F.2d at 316. The judge inlitranerl the court at 5:40 p.m. that the juror's condition
grew worse and that he was replaced with an alternate. Id. The jury returned with the guilty
verdict at approximately 10:30 p.m. Id.
19 Id. 358 F.2d at 317.
SO Id.
81 Leser, 358 E2d at 317. The prejudice the court was addressing was the situation that had
arisen in another case where the alternate retired with the jury and was instructed not to
participate in the proceedings unless one of the regular jurors became ill. Id.; see also United
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In 1968, in United States v. Hayutin, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the practice of not discharg-
ing jury alternates at the beginning of deliberations was not prejudicial
under the circumstances and thus did not automatically require rever-
sal." The district court judge failed to discharge the alternates at the
start of deliberations." The Second Circuit, although admonishing the
lower court for contradicting the mandatory language of Rule 24(c),
upheld the conviction due to the absence of prejudice."
In Hayutin, the district court judge refused to discharge the three
remaining alternates at the commencement of deliberations, although
the defendant requested such discharges." The district court did not
replace any of the regular jurors with these alternates." On appeal, the
Second Circuit pointed to the mandatory nature of the language of
Rule 24(c) that required the discharge of alternates at the outset of
deliberations. 87 Citing the original drafters' consideration of post-sub-
mission substitution and the explicit decision not to incorporate such
a procedure into Rule 24(c), the court questioned the wisdom of
retaining alternate jurors once deliberations had begun." The court
then admonished the district court for retaining alternates in case
substitutes were needed during deliberations, because such a practice
had no statutory or regulatory basis." The court concluded that "the
absence of benefit being so clear and the danger of prejudice so great,
it seems foolhardy to depart from the command of Rule 24." 8° The
Second Circuit, however, did not reverse the lower court conviction
because the defendant suffered no prejudice.'" In sum, while the Hayu-
tin court reiterated the mandatory nature of Rule 24, requiring the
States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 871-72 (4th Cir. 1964) (reversible error to place
alternate with jury during deliberation even if the alternate is instructed not to participate). The
Leser court noted that having more than twelve jurors in deliberation, in contravention of the
constitutional right to a trial by jury, was not an issue because there was nothing in the record
to suggest that more than twelve jurors were present at any time during deliberations. 358 F.2d
at 318.





" Harlin, 398 F.2d at 950.
88 See id
89 Id. This decision appears to disapprove of the earlier Ninth Circuit opinion Leser, in which
the court affirmed the retention of alternates in hopes of a stipulation by both parties. See id;
see also Leser, 358 F.2d at 317. The Hayulin court never cites the Leserdecision, but questions the
rationale behind this earlier decision. See 398 F.2d at 950.
9° Hayulin, 398 F.2d at 950.
to Id.
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dismissal of alternates after deliberations had begun, it chose not to
reverse the district court's error in the absence of prejudice." 2
The Ninth Circuit, which allowed the post-submission juror sub-
stitution upon the knowing and intelligent stipulations of both parties
in Leser, refused to expand that standard in 1968, in United States. v.
Lamb.° The Lamb court, noting the importance of deliberations free
of coercion, held that the defendant's failure to consent to the alter-
nate substitution alter deliberations had begun made the district court's
action reversible."' Limiting the Leser holding to instances where the
parties' consent is clear and undisputed, the court refused to extend
this exception to situations involving implied consent."'
In Lamb, the district court judge excused the alternate juror at the
start of deliberations with the instruction to "stand by" in case her
presence became necessary."6 Four hours into deliberations, one of the
jurors informed the judge that due to the sudden accidental death of
a close friend, he was unable emotionally to render a decision."' After
questioning the juror, the judge discharged the juror and substituted
the alternate."8 Defense counsel objected and immediately made a
motion for a mistrial."'" The judge denied defense counsel's motion and
the alternate juror joined the original panel," Twenty-nine minutes
later, the jury returned a guilty verdict.'"'
In reversing the district court's verdict, the Ninth Circuit held that
alternate substitution after the start of deliberations and without the
defendant's consent is fraught with coercive dangers on the new juror
and thus constitutes reversible error. 102 The court explained that Rule
24(c)'s mandatory language serves the important task of protecting
the sanctity of deliberations.m By ignoring the mandate of this rule,
92 Id. The absence of prejudice, according to the court, was due to the precautionary
procedures employed by the lower court. Id. The alternates were sequestered separately, and the
record demonstrates an absence of communication between the alternates and the jurors during
deliberations. Id.
93 See 529 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1975),
54 Id. at 1156-57.
95 /d. at 1157.
96 Id. at 1154-55. The judge even allowed the juror to go home during this "stand by" period.
Id. at 1155.
97 Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1155. The juror informed the judge through a note, which stated: "your
honor, due to the sudden accidental death of one of my close co-workers during the course of




191 Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1155.
mid. at 1156-57.
"See id. at 1156.
858	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 35:847
the court explained, the district court judge placed the alternate in an
inherently coercive atmosphere in which the jury may have already
determined the final verdict." The Lamb court determined that such
impermissible coercion was clearly present because deliberations, which
had been in progress for approximately four hours prior to the alter-
nate substitution, only lasted twenty-nine minutes after the replace-
ment." Thus, the court concluded that the jury had failed to clearly
and conscientiously reconsider the issues in the manner required to
guarantee the defendant a fair trial." Additionally, the court noted
that the defendant not only failed to offer the consent which may have
validated the court's procedure, but in fact objected to the substitu-
tion.m7 Reaffirming the importance of protecting uncoerced delibera-
tions, and implicitly limiting Leser to situations involving the knowing,
intelligent and undisputed consent of the defendant, the Lamb court
reversed the district court's decision because the defendant never
consented to the substitution procedure."
In 1981, in United States v. Phillips, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that post-submission substitution was
permitted in exceptional circumstances if the defendant suffered no
prejudice, thereby expanding the district court's power."At the outset
of the deliberations, the district court judge chose not to discharge the
remaining alternate juror, although the defense objected to such a
move. 11' After a day and a half of deliberations, one of the jurors was
hospitalized and consequently discharged from the jury."' The district
court replaced the juror with the remaining alternate and instructed
the jury to begin deliberations anew." 2 Six clays later the jury reached
a verdict." 3
In support of the district court's post-submission substitution, the
Fifth Circuit noted that the language of Rule 24(c) which deals with
104 Id. Likewise, the court reasoned that the district court's alternate substitution could
encourage situations in which the lone dissenting juror is pressured to "feign illness or other
incapacity so as to place the burden of decision on an alternate juror." Id.
m5 Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156. The short period of deliberations, while indicating the presence
of coercion on the will of the new juror, also appeared to violate an explicit court instruction to
begin deliberations anew after the substitution of an alternate. Id.
106 See id. at 1156.
lc' Id. at 1157.
113€ See id. at 1156-57.
144 Phillips, 664 F.2d at 996.
II° Id. at 990. The court ordered that the alternate be sequestered from the regular jury. Id.
"I Id. The juror who was discharged had suffered a heart attack and thus was clearly unable
to resume deliberations. Id.
112 Phillips, 664 F.2d at 990-91.
113 id. at 991.
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the substitution of alternate jurors before deliberations is not constitu-
tionally mandated.''`' According to the court, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure were not intended to be a rigid code inflexible to
special circumstances."' The court emphasized the fact that the pre-
cautions taken by the trial court judge, such as sequestering the alter-
nate separately during preliminary deliberations and carefully instruct-
ing each juror to begin deliberations anew, protected the alternate
from the inherently coercive atmosphere present when a new juror
joins a group already involved in deliberation."' The court reasoned
that these precautions, combined with the fact that the jury deliberated
for another week, negated the possibility of any coercion." 7 Expressly
disagreeing with the Lamb court's holding that any post-submission
substitution requires reversal, the Phillips' court cited the Federal Rule's
focus on simplicity, fairness and the elimination of unjustifiable delay
to justify the district court's substitution procedure."" While the Phillips
court limited its holding to situations involving exceptional circum-
stances,"" it nonetheless expanded the district court's post-submission
juror substitution powers.'"
Continuing this trend, in the 1986 case of Peek v. Kemp, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the post-sub-
mission substitution of a juror did not constitute a reversible error in
the absence of any identifiable prejudice.' 2 ' After the jury deliberated
for approximately two hours, the foreman informed the court that one
of the jurors was "at the breaking point" and wanted to be excused.' 22
Without interviewing the juror, the district court dismissed him and
i" Id. at 992.
115 M. at 993.
316 Id. at 995-96. The court pointed out the concern that when an alternate joins a jury after
deliberations have begun, the alternate may be coerced into supporting previously accepted
viewpoints or decisions. Phillips, 664 F.2d at 995. The procedural measures implemented by the
trial court, however, negated the potential for undue influence under the circumstances. Id. at
995-96. Here the trial judge questioned each of the regular jurors individually to ensure Mat
they would be able to begin deliberations anew, and then instructed the jury to do just that. Id.
at 996.
118 Id. at 996 n.21. The court cited Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Phillips,
664 17.2d at 996 n.21. The full text of the rule is as follows: "These rules are intended to provide
for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall he consulted to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay," FED. R. GRIM. P. 2.
1 u) Phillips, 664 F.2d at 996. The "exceptional context" alluded to by the court refers to the
lad that the trial was extremely complex and lasted fOur months, Id.
'20 See id. at 995-96.
121 784 F.2c1 1479, 1485 (11th Cir.), eat. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
122 14. at 1481-82.
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seated an alternate. 123 Subsequent fact-finding revealed that the re-
placed juror was the lone hold-out at the time of the dismissa1. 124
In affirming the district court's decision, the Peek court noted that
the record supported the finding that the juror was too ill to continue
del iberations. 125 The court further explained that the defendant's right
to be tried by the originally selected jury must sometimes be subordi-
nated to the public's interest in achieving fair trials that result in jury
verdicts.' 26 Concluding that the district court's failure to question the
ill juror did not result in any prejudice, the Peek court affirmed the
post-submission substitution and found no constitutional error. 127
The Fifth Circuit expanded its Phillips holding in 1992, when it
decided United States v. Quiroz-Cortez.' 28 The Quiroz- Cortez court affir-
med the post-submission juror substitution because the defendant suf-
fered no prejudice.' 29 Forty-five minutes after the jury retired into
deliberations, the district court learned that one of the jurors had a
hearing impediment which may have prevented him from hearing all
of the testimony.'" After questioning the juror, the district court de-
cided to replace him with one of the available alternates, who had
already been dismissed."' Defense counsel objected and asked for a
mistrial, which the trial court immediately denied." 2
The Quiroz -Cortez court pointed out that Rule 24(c) does not
expressly forbid the substitution of jurors after deliberations have com-
menced.'" Instead, noted the court, this prohibition originated in
prior case law.'" The court then concluded that verdicts remained
binding if the defendant suffered no prejudice.'" Under the circum-
stances, the court found the risk of prejudice minimal in light of the
court's explicit instruction to start deliberations from the beginning,
and the fact that the jury deliberated for an hour and a half after the
alternate had been substituted."6 The court failed to mention the
123 Id. at 1482.
129
L25 Id. at 1483.
126 Peek, 784 F.2d at 1484.
121 Id. at 1485.
12" See 960 F.2d 418, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1992).
129 Id. at 421.
13° Id. at 419.
131 1d. As the jury retired into deliberations, the judge dismissed the two alternates and
instructed them not to discuss the case with anyone until a verdict had been rendered. Id.
Quiroz- Cortez, 960 F.2d at 419. After the judge denied the motion for a mistrial, the defense
counsel settled for the first alternate. Id.
133





960 F.2d at 420. The court also minimized any potential prejudice by
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exceptional circumstances requirement stated in Phillips. 137 Thus, while
reaffirming the mandatory nature of Rule 24(c)'s language, the Qui-
roz-Cortez court decided only to enforce this provision if the defendant
suffered prejudice.' 38
These cases illustrate the willingness of certain circuits to depart
from the mandatory language of Rule 24(c) in limited circumstances,
and hold that post-submission substitution does not mandate automat-
ic reversal.'• The exception originally applied only when both parties
stipulated to the procedure.'" Subsequent courts expanded the post
submission juror substitution procedure to exceptional circumstances, 14 '
and cases where the defendant suffered no prejudice.'"
IN. POST-SUBMISSION SUBSTITUTION BY CALIFORNIA COURTS:
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 1089 AND THE EMERGING TREND
IN ITS APPLICATION
Unlike the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which purport
to prohibit the substitution of alternate jurors after the start of delib-
erations,'" California Penal Code section 1089 explicitly authorizes this
practice.'" The statute allows the court to discharge any juror, "whether
before or after the final submission of the case to the jury," if that 'juror
dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is
found to be unable to perform his duty," and to replace that juror with
an alternate.'" Before the 1933 amendment allowing post-submission
substitution, this statute only authorized alternate substitutions before
a case was submitted to the jury.'" The California legislature enacted
the amendment, in part, to prevent the needless expenditures of prose-
cution, defense and judicial resources that result from declaring mis-
trials after a lengthy trial.' 47
Over the years, California courts have employed section 1089
under a variety of circumstances.'" The least controversial cases have
extensively questioning the alternate to ensure that she had not discussed the case with anyone
since she had been released. Id. at 419.
137 See id., 960 F.2d at 420-21.
13 /d. at 420.
139 See, e.g., Quiroz-Cortex, 960 F.2d at 420; Hayulin, 388 F.2d at 950; Leser, 358 F.2d at 317-18.
110 See Leser, 358 F.2d at 317-18.
141 Phillips, 664 F.2d at 996.
142 Quiroz -Cortez, 960 F.2d at 420; Hayulin, 398 F,2d at 950.
143 FED. R. Cum. 1'. 24(c).
144 CAL. PENAL COVE § 1089 (West 1985).
145 Id.
148 See People v. Thomas, 267 Cal. Rptr. 865, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
147 See id. at 870-71.
148 See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274, 303-04 (Cal. 1992); People v. Daniels, 802 P.2(1
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involved juror illness or requests for discharge, as these causes fall
directly under the explicit language of the act. 149 Citing the "other good
cause" provision of section 1089, trial court judges discharged jurors
for a variety of reasons, including a death in the juror's family,'" a
change in the juror's state of residence, 15 ' or juror bias which became
known to the court.' 52 In determining what constitutes good cause, the
trial court's discretion is clearly limited and subject to reversal.'" Al-
though section 1089 fails to specify the required procedures when
exercising this discretion, the California Supreme Court has outlined
certain procedures to be followed when substituting an alternate dur-
ing deliberations.' 54
One of the early cases to rely on section 1089 to justify the substi-
tution of an alternate juror was the 1956 case of People v. Abbott. 155 In
Abbott, the California Supreme Court held that the trial court was fully
within its discretion when it discharged a juror due to the potential
embarrassment or criticism which may have resulted from the unique
circumstances.'" The Abbott court noted that section 1089 empowered
the trial court to determine if good cause existed to replace a juror
with an alternate. 157
Approximately eleven days into the presentation of evidence, the
trial court learned that one of the jurors worked in the same office as
the defendant's brother.'" The juror denied ever having spoken to the
defendant's brother, and only discovered his identity when he was
pointed out in court.'" The judge replaced the juror with an alternate
in order to save him from any potential embarrassment or criticism." 4 '
906, 929 (Cal.), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 145 (1990; People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742, 750 (Cal. 1976),
cert. denied, 929 U.S. 1077 (1977).
145 See l'eople v. Dell, 283 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (one juror replaced
when she had an attack of phlebitis during the trial; another replaced after suffering minor
injuries in accident); People v. Pervoe, 207 Cal. Rptr. 622, 631 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (juror replaced
when arthritis condition acted up during trial).
15° People v. Ashmus, 820 P.2d 214, 245 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 124 (1992) (court
cited death of juror's mother as good cause to discharge juror).
151
 People v, Green, 93 Cal. Rptr, 84, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
152 People v. Abbott, 303 P.2d 730, 756-37 (Cal. 1956).
155 E.g, Roberts, 826 P.2d at 304; Collins, 552 P.2d at 748.
154 See Collins, 552 P.2d at 747. Although § 1089 does not expressly mandate any specific
procedural mechanisms during post-submission substitutions, the Collins court construed this
statute to require that deliberations begin anew after the substitution of an alternate. See id.
166 See 303 1',2d at 736-37.
156 H.
157 See id.
158 Id. at 736. The juror informed the court that his desk was approximately twenty-five feet
away from that of the defendant's brother. Id.
159 Id.





In reviewing the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court of
California held that the determination of "good cause" under section
1089 was within the trial court's discretion."'' The court stated that
absent any abuse of this discretion, the trial court's determination
would stand. 1 " 2 The Abbott court also permitted courts to exercise pro-
cedural discretion when implementing section 1089. 1 °'i Citing the ab-
sence of any statutory provision in section 1089 requiring specific
procedural mechanisms, the Abbott court explained that adherence to
the formal rules of evidence was not necessary if the facts on which
the substitution was predicated were uncontroverted. 1 f'4 Thus, the court
noted that the taking of sworn testimony was not necessary under these
circumstances.'" While the substitution in Abbott occurred prior to
deliberations, the court significantly explained the trial court's dis-
cretion with respect to section 1089 and the determination of good
cause.' 66
In the 1963 case of People v. Hamilton, the Supreme Court of
California held that the juror's act of reading the penal code in an
effort to become better informed did not constitute, on its own, any
inability to perform her duties as a juror. 167 The court restricted section
1089 to the four situations covered by the explicit language of the
statute: juror death or illness, other good cause, or when a juror
requests a discharge.' 68 Explaining that the juror's conduct did not fall
within these established categories, the Hamilton court reversed the
trial court's post-submission substitution decision. 119
The alternate substitution issue arose after the jury reached a
verdict on the issue of guilt and during the presentation of evidence
at the penalty phase of the trial.'" The trial court discovered that one
of the regular jurors read the penal code for the purpose of becoming
well informed. 171 The juror stated her intention to accept the law as
explained by the court and not to substitute her own interpretations.' 72
161 Id. at 736-37; see CAL. PENAL Cow, § 1089.
1112 Abbott, 303 P.2d at 736-37.
161/ See id. at 736.
164 Id.
LID
166 See Abbott, 303 P.2d at 735-36.
167 383 P.2d 412,424 (Cal. 1963).
l° Id, at 423; see. CAL, PEN. CODE § 1089.
11111 hi. at 423-24.
170 Id. at 422.
171 Id. The juror also said that she did not understand the code and that she had not looked
for those specific sections of the code which were pertinent to the case. Id. Instead, she claimed
to have read the code in its entirety. Id.
172 Hamilton, 383 P.2d at 422. Additionally; the juror maintained that she had not talked to
any of the other jurors about having read the code, Id.
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In response to this finding, the trial court discharged the juror and
replaced her with an alternate, citing section 1089 as its authority.'"
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Hamilton court deter-
mined that the lower court had abused its discretion because there was
no statutory basis for its decision. 174 The court explained that the mere
reading of the penal code does not, on its own merit, render an
individual unable to perform the duties of a juror.'" Thus, the court
held that juror misconduct did not fall under the purview of section
1089. 376 The Hamilton court cited the legislative history of section 1089
to demonstrate a clear unwillingness of the Legislature to endorse the
practice of unlimited substitutions ofjurors.' 77 The court reasoned that
an overly broad discretionary standard would allow trial courts to
"load" juries by replacing jurors without proper, or any cause.'" Unlike
the Abbott decision in which the court endorsed the trial court's dis-
cretionary power,' 79
 the Hamilton court limited substitution to the
instances specifically enumerated in section 1089.'"
In 1971, in the seminal case of People v. Collins, the California
Supreme Court held that the failure of the trial court to instruct the
jury to begin deliberations anew, after an alternate had replaced a
regular juror, constituted a harmless error and thus did not require
reversa1. 18 ' The trial court replaced a juror who requested to be dis-
charged for cause.'" The Collins court provided a thorough review of
section 1089, including a discussion of its constitutionality and the
necessary procedural requirements for substitution.'"
173 Id. After the court chose to discharge this juror, defense counsel moved for a mistrial and
then asked the court whether the discharge was predicated on the juror's misconduct. Id. at 423.
Upon learning that the decision was based on misconduct, defense moved for a mistrial not only
for the penalty phase of the case, but also for the guilt phase, claiming that the juror's ability to
deliberate was impaired for the entire trial. Id. The trial court denied the motion, stating that
only after reading the code had the juror become unable to perform her duties, and that this
occurred after the guilt phase was completed. Id.
174 Hamilton, 383 P.2d at 423.
175 Id. Absent any indication that this juror would substitute her own knowledge for the
instructions given by the court, or that she would discuss her reading with the other jurors, the
Hamilton court indicated that there was no basis for disqualification. Id
176 Id. at 425. Thus, the Hamilton court explained that the proper course of action in light
of juror misconduct is for the judge to declare a mistrial. Id.
177 Hamilton, 383 P.2d at 424.
178 See id. at 425,
179 See Abbott, 303 P.2d at 736-37.
18° See Hamilton, 383 P.2d at 423-25.
181 Collins, 552 P.2d at 744,749.
182 Id. at 744.
183 Id. at 744-49.
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After the jury deliberated for approximately one and a half hours,
the trial court received a note from one of the jurors who asked to be
discharged because she was unable to follow the trial court's instruc-
dons concerning deliberations.' After questioning the juror and dis-
covering that she felt unable to cope with the experience of being a
juror, the trial court discharged this juror and replaced her with an
alternate.'" The defense objected 'to the substitution and asked for a
mistrial.'" The trial court denied the motion.'" After the substitution,
the trial court failed to instruct the jury to start deliberations from the
beginning and a verdict was returned a few hours later.' 88
In upholding the trial court's decision to replace the juror with
an alternate, the Collins court reiterated the limited discretion afforded
the trial court when attempting to determine whether good cause
exists under section 1089.' 89 The inability of the juror to perform her
duties, according to the Collins court, "must appear in the record as a
demonstrable reality." 19" The Collins court indicated that some type of
court investigation was necessary to reach the conclusion that a juror
was unable to perform her duties.'`" The court concluded that the
thorough hearing conducted by the trial court was sufficient to dem-
onstrate this reality.' 92
The Collins court also discussed the procedural requirements that
must accompany the substitution of a regular juror with an alternate
after deliberations have begun under the authority of section 1089.'"
In order to ensure that defendants received a unanimous verdict reached
by a jury of twelve, the court stated that the proper construction of
section 1089 requires that deliberations begin anew any time an alter-
nate replaces a juror during the course of deliberations.' 94 The court
reasoned that in order to arrive at a unanimous verdict, the jury must
deliberate and review all applicable evidence. 19' The court noted the
184 Id. at 744. The juror stated that she felt more emotionally than intellectually involved in
the case and thus would not be able to render a decision based on the evidence or the law. /d
185 id.
186 Collins, 552 P.2d at 744.
187 /d.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 748.
l9° Id.
191 See Collins, 552 P.2d at 748.
192 1d. The court refuted the idea that the juror must provide a factual basis to justify her
request for a discharge, explaining that such a requirement in this case would add nothing to
the inquiry Id.
152 1d. at 746-47.
154 1d. at 747,
' 95 1d. at 746.
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importance of the personal reactions and interactions among the ju-
rors throughout the deliberation.' 96 A juror who is thrust into a situ-
ation in which deliberations are ongoing, according to the court, loses
the benefit of these interpersonal dynamics unless deliberations begin
anew.'97
Despite the court's conclusion that the trial court had failed to
give the proper instructions, the court affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion because the error was harmless. 198
 The court noted that the case
against the defendants was very strong and there was no indication
that a different, more favorable verdict would have resulted from the
issuing of the proper instructions. ]99 The court reasoned that although
trial courts are bound by procedural requirements regarding substitu-
tion, failure to adhere to these requirements does not mandate reversal
in the absence of prejudice:2m Thus, the court upheld the trial court's
guilty verdict:201
In 1989, in People v. Aikens, the Court of Appeals for the Second
District of California held that the substitution of an alternate juror
after the jury had reached a verdict on one of the two counts was
proper. 2°2 After replacing the juror, the trial court issued the instruc-
tion mandated by the Collins court and informed the jury to begin
deliberations on the second count from the beginning:2°3 The court of
appeals affirmed the decision based on an interplay of factors. 204
First, the Aikens court noted that the trial court judge issued the
proper instructions. 2°5 These instructions, reasoned the court, pre-
served the defendant's right to a verdict reached after the full partici-
pation in deliberations of the twelve jurors who ultimately issue the
verdict. 206 Next, the court cited the one-sided nature of the case making
the possibility of prejudice minimal:207 Both victims and one inde-
196 See Collins, 552 P.2d at 746.
107 See id. at 746-47.
19 Id. at 749.
191 Id.
20" Id. at 748-49.
201 Collins, 552 P2d at 749.
2°2 254 Cal. Rptr. 30, 31-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
203 Id. at 32. The instructions read, in relevant pall:
You are therefore instructed to set aside and disregard all past deliberations as to
Count 2 and begin those deliberations anew. This must mean that each remaining




 See id. at 32-33.
205 Id. at 32.
216 See id.'




pendent witness positively identified the defendant, thus negating the
only defense asserted—mis-identification. 2°8 Finally, the court deter-
mined that a policy denying trial courts the ability to replace jurors
with alternates in post-verdict situations would have negative conse-
quences. 2" For instance, the Aikens court explained that trial courts
would likely refuse to discharge jurors in these situations, creating the
potential for a hurried and dispassionate consideration of the evidence
and a rushed judgment. 210 The Aikens court concluded that trial courts
should balance the constitutional rights of the accused against the state
interest in judicial economy. 2 " Recognizing the conflicting interests
involved, the court struck the balance in favor of the state interest and
affirmed the post-verdict substitution. 212
Continuing to recognize these important state interests, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in the 1991 case of People v. Daniels, held that
juror misconduct now constituted good cause for juror substitution. 213
The trial court received word that one of the jurors was violating court
instructions by discussing the case with outsiders and had expressed
an opinion on the issue of guilt prior to deliberations. 2 " The trial court
concluded, after an investigatory hearing, that the juror was guilty of
serious misconduct that would prevent both sides from receiving a fair
tria1. 215 The trial court replaced the juror with an alternate. 216
In affirming the replacement of the juror, the Daniels court voiced
its disapproval of the language in Hamilton concerning juror miscon-
duct. 2 " Unlike the Hamilton court, the Daniels court explained that
juror misconduct provided good cause to determine that a juror would
be unable to perform his duty.2 t 8 The court noted that misconduct
raised the presumption of prejudice. 219 The substitution of a juror
208 hi.
2°91
	 id. at 32-33.
210 Id. The court went on to say that a refusal to substitute an alternate for the juror in thin
case would have been an abuse of the trial court's discretion, Id. at 33.
211 Aikens, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 33. The court pointed out four fitctors which support the
post-submission substitution of an alternate. Id. First, the court cited the traumatic effect that
relitigating the issues would have on the victims. Id. Next the court explained that the expense
involved in retrying cases would be considerable. Id. Thirdly, the court expressed its concern that
public confidence in the system would be eroded due to the needless prolongation of criminal
proceedings, Id. Finally, the court stated that any deterrence would be diluted because any
convictions would be so remote fithn the actual crime. Id.
212 Aikens, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 31-33.
213 See Daniels, 802 P.2d at 929.
214 M.
215 Id. at 929-31.
21 " Id. at 920.
217 Id. at 930; see Hamilton, 383 P.2d at 423-25.
WI Danids, 802 P.2d at 929, 930-31.
219 1d. at 929.
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engaged in misconduct promotes judicial efficiency, according to the
court; likewise, a strict rule barring substitution in these situations and
mandating mistrials would have a "monstrous effect" on the judicial
process. 22° Thus, in Daniels, the court explicitly expanded the discre-
tion of the trial court to replace a juror with an alternate by recogniz-
ing misconduct as "good cause" for juror substitution. 221
Although section 1089 helps to promote judicial efficiency by
preventing repeated litigation of certain trials, the California Supreme
Court has recognized that the application of section 1089 could poten-
tially lead to certain abuses. 222 For example, in 1992, in People v. Roberts,
the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's substitution of
an ill juror. 223 The court explicitly recognized and discussed the inher-
ent danger of allowing a jury to exercise control over its makeup by
encouraging substitution. 224
In Roberts, a juror became ill during a weekend recess in the
course of deliberations. 225 Although the juror indicated that she might
be able to resume her duties in three days, the trial court discharged
her and seated an alternate. 220 In reaching its decision, the trial court
solicited input from the jury as to their preference. 227 The jury con-
ferred momentarily, then announced its preference for the substitu-
tion of an alternate. 228 After the substitution, defense counsel learned
from the discharged juror that she had reservations concerning a
verdict that had been reached while she was a member of the jury,
and that the other members of the panel were displeased with these
doubts.22° The juror also informed defense counsel that she would have
preferred to continue deliberations if permitted by the court. 23°
220 Id. at 929, 930.
221 Id. at 930-31.
222 See Roberts, 826 P.2d at 303-04; see also People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1116 (Cal. 1988)
(court recognized that certain actions of the court, if not handled correctly, can have coercive
effect on jury); People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251, 1260 (Cal. 1986) (court recognized that
foreperson's assertion that another juror was intoxicated during deliberations may have been
motivated by concerns other than integrity of deliberative process).
223 826 P.2d at 304.
221 Id.
223 Id. at 303.
2211 id.
227 m.
228 Roberts, 826 P.2d at 303. While defense counsel agreed that the jury should be informed
of the juror's illness, counsel wanted to ensure that the jury did not think that they had the power
to choose whether to seat an alternate. Id.
229 Id.
23° Id. at 303-04. The defense submitted an affidavit with these statements from the juror.
Id, at 303. Additionally, the defendant based the appeal on the fact that the court erred in
removing the "recalcitrant juror" to facilitate a unanimous verdict. Id. at 304.
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In upholding the lower court's substitution decision, the Roberts
court reiterated the well accepted notion that the trial court's discre-
tion is limited, and the cause cited for the discharge must appear in
the record as a demonstrable reality."' The court reasoned that this
standard was satisfied because the trial court spoke on the telephone
with the ill juror and confirmed her condition."' While determining
that the trial court acted within its discretion, the Roberts court warned
against allowing jurors to exercise control over their own composi-
tion.'" The court explained that the determination of good cause and
whether to a substitute an alternate should be made exclusively by the
trial court and not by the jurors. 2" 4 In affirming the trial court's substi-
tution of an alternate, the court indicated that merely consulting the
jury with respect to the decision did not automatically demonstrate
impermissible jury control and was within the trial court's discretion.'"
As demonstrated, California courts have employed section 1089
to replace jurors who become unable to perform their duties, either
before or after the commencement of deliberations, for a variety of
reasons."' While the California Supreme Court repeatedly discussed
the limited discretion of trial courts in making the determination as
to when to utilize section 1089, it repeatedly affirmed the trial court
decisions.'" Additionally, the court established certain procedural re-
quirements that are necessary when exercising this power, including
appropriate investigation into the cause of the discharge and the re-
quired jury instructions.'" The California Supreme Court has con-
cluded, however, that violations of these common law mandates do not
require automatic reversal in the absence of prejudice.'"
IV. THE REGINALD DENNY TRIAL
Section 1089 played a pivotal role in the Denny trial:24° The trial
court judge employed this provision to discharge and replace one of
231 Id.
232 Id.
253 Roberts, 826 11.2d at 304.
2391d.
235 See id.
236 See, e.g., Roberts, 826 P.2d at 304; Daniels, 802 P.2d at 980-31; Collins, 552 P.20 at 748.
237 See, e.g., Roberts, 826 P.2d at 304; Collins, 552 P.20 at 748; Abbott, 303 P.20 at 737.
238 See. Collins, 552 P.20 at 747-48.
239 See, e.g., Roberts, 826 P.2(1 at 304; Collins, 552 P.20 at 748.
210 See Transcript at 8208, People v. Williams, No. BA058116 (L.A. Super. Ct. 1993); Edward
J. Boyer & Ashley Dunn, Denny juror Dismissed; Deliberations Start Over, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12,1998,
at MO.
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the jurors for failing to deliberate. 24 ' The decision received consider-
able publicity as people questioned both the rationale and fairness
underlying this post-submission juror substitution. 242
A. Factual Background
On April 29, 1992, while passing through the intersection of
Florence and Normandie Avenues in Los Angeles, California, truck
driver Reginald Denny was pulled from his vehicle and brutally at-
tacked in the riots following the verdicts in the Rodney King tria1. 243
Approximately two weeks later, the Los Angeles Police Department
arrested Henry Keith Watson and Damian Monroe Williams, and charged
them with beating Denny. 244
 On August 19, 1993, the Denny trial began
in the Superior Court of Los Angeles, with Judge John W. Ouderkirk,
a former deputy district attorney and police officer, presiding."' The
trial lasted until September 30, 1993, when the case was submitted to
the jury. 246
 Deliberations lasted approximately two weeks, marked by
periods of high tension and controversy."' On October 18, 1993, the
jury returned thirteen verdicts. 248 Damian Williams was acquitted on
all counts except a mayhem charge , 249
 for which he received 10 years
in prison. 25° Henry Watson was also acquitted on most counts. 251 With
respect to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon, the court de-
clared a mistria1. 2 • 2
During this high-pressured, racially significant trial, the composi-
tion of the jury underwent significant changes. 253 At the outset of the
trial, twelve jurors were chosen for the panel along with six alter-
nates. 254 During the trial, Judge Ouderkirk replaced two jurors with
24t Transcript at 8208, 8217, 8219, Williams, No. BA058116.
242 See Kaplan & Pryor, supra note 13, at 32; Dunn & McMillan, supra note 14, at A29.
245 Edward J. Boyer 8c Jesse Katz, jury Convicts Denny Defendants On Reduced Charges, Acquits




247 See Dunn & McMillan, supra note 14, at Al, A29.
246 Boyer & Katz, supra note 243, at Al, A18.
249 Id. at Al.
250 EdwardJ. Boyer & Andrea Ford, Williams Given Maximum 10 Years In Denny Beating, L.A.
Tisms, Dec. 8, 1993, at Al .
251 Boyer & Katz, supra note 243, at Al.
262 Edward J. Boyer & John L. Mitchell, Watson Pleads Guilty to Felony Count in Riot Case,
L.A. TirdEs, Nov. 3, 1993, at Al. Watson eventually pleaded guilty to this unresolved charge in
exchange for a sentence of probation. Id.
253 See Dunn & McMillan, supra note 14, at Al, A29.
254 See id, at A29.
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alternates due to health related problems. 255 Immediately after the start
of deliberations, Judge Ouderkirk discharged a juror for good cause. 25f'
The court learned that this juror, brandishing the fact that he was a
member of the jury in the Denny trial, read newspapers concerning
the case, discussed the case with others and even announced his inten-
tion to convict the defendants before hearing the defense attorneys
put on their case. 257 judge Ouderkirk also replaced this juror with an
alternate.258
The most publicized juror substitution took place on October 11,
1993, after deliberations had been underway for over one week: 25Y
Judge Ouderkirk discharged an elderly black woman, juror 373, for
good cause, stating that she was failing to deliberate. 260 The court then
replaced the juror with an alternate. 2" 1 The other eleven jurors on the
panel initiated this substitution by submitting a note to the court
complaining about the juror and questioning her mental faculties. 262
The final juror substitution in this case occurred the very next
day. 2m One of the jurors requested a discharge for an unspecified
personal hardship. 264 Judge Ouderkirk granted the juror's request and
replaced him with an alternate:26' The court's decision to discharge
and replace this juror depleted the pool of available alternate jurors
to one. 2""
B. Section 1089 Applied to the Denny Jury Substitution: Juror 373
Of the five substitutions that transpired throughout the course of
the Denny case, the replacement of juror 373 for "failing to deliberate"
sparked the most controversy.267 According to one critic, replacing a
259 Id.
256 Id.
257 Edward J. Boyer, Another Denny Juror Out; Panel Starts Over, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993, at
Al, A13.
258 a
259 See Kaplan & Pryor, supra note 13, at 32; Boyer & Dunn, supra note 240, at Al; Dunn &
McMillan, supra note 14, at A29.
260 Id.
`261 Boyer & Dunn, supra note 240, at Al.
262 Kaplan & Pryor, supra note 13, at 32.





substitutions fall more directly within the trial court's discretion because illness and misconduct
have been previously cited as valid reasons to discharge a juror and substitute an alternate. See,
e.g., People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274, 304 (Cal. 1992); People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742, 748 (Cal.
See Kaplan & Pryor, supra note 13, at 32; Boyer & Dunn, supra note 240, at A16. The other
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juror for failing to deliberate "is unheard of." 268 Some critics accused
the judge of stacking or manipulating the jury in order to ensure a
verdict, while others objected to the apparent power of the jury over
its own composition. 269
 Judge Ouderkirk's decision raises questions as
to the extent of the trial court's discretion to determine what consti-
tutes good cause under section 1089, and whether such a substitution
can adversely affect the substantive rights of the accused. 27° In order to
explore the rationale behind this pivotal decision, this Section will ex-
amine the entire process which resulted in the removal of juror 373. 27 '
On Monday, October 11, 1993, eleven members of the jury in the
Denny trial informed the court, through a note, of a problem which
had developed in deliberations, bringing all progress to an impasse. 272
The note indicated that one of the jurors, number 373, could not
comprehend anything the jury was attempting to accomplish and
repeated efforts to help her understand the process failed. 279 The note
concluded that this juror should be removed from deliberations. 274 The
judge informed both parties of the situation and his plan to investigate
the matter. 275 The defense objected to any court inquiry into the mat-
ter, claiming that the other jurors were not capable or permitted to
pass judgment on the qualifications of a juror. 27° The authority to pass
judgment on juror qualifications, according to the defense, rested
solely with the court. 277 Because the court had subjected juror 373 to
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977). Likewise, case law supports the practice of replacing a
juror who requests a discharge for personal reasons, when such reasons would affect the juror's
capacity to adequately perform die duties of a juror. See People v. Coins, 173 Cal. Rptr. 655,656
(1981) (upheld trial court's discretion to excuse a juror who claimed that relationship to witness
would prevent him from rendering impartial verdict).
2611
 See Kaplan & Pryor, supra note 13, at 32.
269
 See id.
27" See Kaplan & Pryor, supra note 13, at 32.
271 See supra notes 272-335 and accompanying text.
272 Transcript at 8148,8152, People v. Williams, No. BA058116 (L.A. Super. Ct. 1993).
273 Id. at 8152. The note read as follows:
Judge on behalf of eleven jurors we are in agreement that juror number 373 cannot
comprehend anything that we have been trying to accomplish. We have tried
patiently to talk and work with her all to no avail. It is unanimous, and we feel she
shouldn't continue in the deliberations. This has nothing to do with her views on
issues or her personally—she doesn't use common sense. Lastly, just when we have




275 Id. at 8149-50.
276 1d. at 8151.
277 Transcript at 8151-52, Williams, No. BA058116.
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an extensive selection process and to voir dire, 278 the defense argued
that the other jurors had no authority to assess her qualifications. 27"
The court rejected this argument's"
To investigate the circumstances which prompted the note, Judge
Ouderkirk questioned several jurors, including juror 373. 281 The first
juror interviewed was the foreperson, who expressed the serious frus-
tration of the entire pane1. 282 The foreperson stated that the presence
of juror 373 in deliberations would likely prevent the jury from reach-
ing a verdict on any of the numerous coun ts." 88 In support of this claim,
the foreperson recounted instances where juror 373 would raise her
hand in agreement with whatever had been decided, and then deny
voting on the matter soon thereafter. 281 Referring to juror 373 as a
"stumbling block," the foreperson also explained how the other jurors
had repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted, both collectively and
individually, to aid 373's understanding of the material through the
use of simple examples sketched on the chalkboard. 285 Additionally, the
foreperson noted that while the rest of the jury was able to remember
the nicknames of the other jurors which were written on the chalk-
board for a long period of time, juror 373 could not remember them. 28"
Assuring the court that the note had nothing to do with juror 373's
stance on the issues, the foreperson claimed that juror 373 was not
participating in deliberations and, in fact, her behavior thwarted any
potential progress. 287 Questioning juror 373's mental capacity, the fore-
person recounted that while the jury was discussing important matters,
juror 373 would be looking at a variety of papers and notes which
appeared to be in total disarray. 2" The foreperson concluded that juror
373 was unable to participate meaningfully in deliberations. 28"
278 See Kaplan & Pryor, supra note 13, at 32.
229 See Transcript at 8152; Williams, No. BA058116. The parties selected juror 373 froin a
pool of 128 individuals. Kaplan & Pryor, supra note 13, at 32. She answered a thirty-five page
survey and responded to questions both from the prosecution and defense, Id.
280 See Transcript at 8155; Williams, No. BA058116.
281 Id. at 8160-76, 8182-85.
282 Id. at 8169.
288 Id. The foreperson said that it had gotten to the point where the jury felt that it was either
her or us." Id
254 1d. at 8160.
285 Transcript at 8161, 8163, Williams, No. BA058116.
286 /d. at 8162.
287 Id. at 8164, 8169. The foreperson stated that everyone on the jury respected the different
individual opinions, and that their note had nothing to do with 373's views on the substantive
issues. Id. at 8164
21'8 /d. at 8167.
289 See id.
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After hearing the testimony of the foreperson, Judge Ouderkirk
interviewed two other jurors individually, both of whom reiterated and
expanded on the statements of the foreperson. 2" One juror testified
that juror 373 continually told the other members to organize their
notes, although the jury was unsure what she meant by that request.'
This juror also claimed that juror 373 was constantly confusing her own
notes with the court's instructions."' Finally, this juror questioned the
intelligence of juror 373, claiming that the latter was simply unable to
understand the meaning of basic words, such as "or" and "and." 293 The
final juror interviewed stated that juror 373 was adding her own words
and interpretations to the instructions and thus following her own
law."'" In sum, both jurors concluded that juror 373 lacked the mental
capacity to meaningfully participate in deliberations. 295
Testifying on her own behalf, juror 373 stated her wish that the jury
carefully review all notes and facts before delving into deliberations."'
She believed that such a practice would ensure that the instructions
were fully understood and carefully applied to the correct charges."'
She claimed that the jury was inadvertently omitting certain instruc-
tions from the deliberation process. 2•s Additionally, she denied having
any difficulty comprehending any basic English words, claiming that
the preconceived notion regarding her confusion was erroneous. 299
Juror 373 concluded that the jury's failure to fully incorporate the
court's instructions was preventing the defendants from receiving a fair
trial."' Citing the "I got my mind made up" attitude prevalent in the
deliberation, she claimed that she could not passively participate in a
such a critically important process without voicing her opposition in
light of the abrogation of the defendants' rights."01 While never directly
questioned about denying or forgetting about voting on an issue, juror
373 recalled changing her vote on a preliminary issue after additional
facts were brought to her attention."'
29° See Transcript at 8170-76, 8182-$5, Williams, No. BA058116.
291 Id. at 8172.
29'2 Id. at 8173.
295 M. at 8174.
294 Id. at 8183.
295 See Transcript at 8176, 8183-85; Williams, No. BA058116.
296 Id. at 8186. It became obvious from juror 373's testimony that she (lid not understand
that reviewing court instructions and the facts were part of deliberations. See id.
297 Id. at 8186.
298 Id. at 8188.
..49q
30°Transcript at 8191, Williams, No. BA058116.
5° 1 /d. at 8191, 8192.
$°2 Id. at 8193.
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At the conclusion of these interviews, the prosecution renewed its
motion to remove juror 373, based on her inability to deliberate due
to either incapacity or misconduct."' The prosecution stated that this
juror simply did not have the basic capacity to act as a juror, citing the
instances of alleged forgetfulness and fluctuating position s. 3"4 Additi on-
ally, the prosecution argued that she clearly was not participating
meaningfully in deliberations due to her lack of concentration and her
inability to understand simple language."' The prosecution also stated
that removal was necessary because juror 373 was not following the law
as instructed, but instead was following her own interpretation or
construction of the law." 0Ci Relying on the testimony of the foreperson
and the other two jurors, along with the note which represented the
views of the remaining jurors, the prosecution concluded that juror
373 had to be removed because she simply did not have the capacity
to act as a juror."7
Objecting to the prosecution's motion, defense counsel argued
that juror 373's testimony should be accepted as credible, and that she
should be afforded the same benefit of the doubt given other jurors
in similar circumstances." Defense counsel maintained that the issue
underlying this motion to excuse was the desire for unanimity which
was upset by juror 373's dissenting presence."' The fact that juror 373
would not agree with the other jurors, according to defense counsel,
provided insufficient grounds to justify her dismissal:31 " Next, the de-
fense counsel highlighted the lack of support for one juror's assertion
that juror 373 followed her own law in contravention of the court's
instructions."" Defense counsel concluded that any acts of juror 373
which contradicted specific court instructions clearly did not rise to
3°3 Id. at 8208. The prosecutor cited § 1089 in support of her position, indicating that juror
373 could probably be discharged under the language of the statute, which permits the discharge
of those jurors who are ill. Id. The prosecution also mentioned a previous case in which the judge
had replaced a juror for failing to deliberate. Id. In that case the juror in question attempted to
barter the verdict on one defendant with the verdict on another. Id. at 8208-09. Finally, the
prosecution pointed out that the judge in this case chose to dismiss the juror based on the
testimony of the other members of the jury, whose statements contradicted those of the juror in
question. Id. at 8209.
304 1d. at 8178.
30tTranscript at 8178, Williams, No, 13A058116.
506 Id. at 8195.
307 Id. at 8195-90,
3°8 Id. at 8198-99,8207.
3" M. at 8200.
310 Transcript at 8200, Williams, No. BA058116.
311 Id. at 8201-02.
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the level of another juror's act which did not result in dismissal, but
was instead resolved through a jury instruction."' 2
In that instance, a juror informed the court that certain evidence
should not be considered by the jury.'" Responding to this erroneous
statement of the law, the court issued a specially worded jury instruc-
tion to clarify the misunderstanding. 314 Defense counsel argued that in
this situation, rather than dismissing juror 373 for misconduct, the
court should issue a specific instruction explaining that instructions and
the law must be precisely followed without the addition of any words. 313
The defense's next objection focused on juror 373's desire for
organization. 316 This request for organization, argued defense counsel,
was reasonable because she was simply asking the other members of
the jury to take the time to become familiar with the instructions
before deliberating, rather than discussing the case with the erroneous
presumption that they fully understood the law." 17 Supporting this
argument, defense counsel cited an example where the jury demon-
strated an erroneous presumption concerning the definition of the
term "mob action." 3 ' 8 The court learned of this incorrect presumption
through a note from the jury, and consequently issued a specific
instruction clarifying the term. 316 This example, noted the defense,
demonstrated that juror 373 was correct in her fear that the jury did
not fully comprehend the law. 32° The defense concluded that juror
373's request for organization was reasonable in light of these circum-
stances."'
Defense counsel's final objection centered on juror 373's alleged
forgetfulness."2 They argued that dismissal could not be justified on
this basis because the court failed to question juror 373 on this issue."'
Concluding that the record as a whole provided no basis to find her
guilty of any impropriety, much less misconduct, defense counsel ar-
gued that she should not be removed at such a late stage in the trial. 324
312 Id. at 8203.
313 1d. at 8202.
314 Id at 8203.
313 Transcript at 8203, Williams, No. BA058116,
516 Id. at 8204.
517 a
318 Li
3111 1d. al 8203.
320 SeeTranscript at 8204, Williams, No. BA058116.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 8205.
323 Id.
12,1
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After taking a short recess to research the issue, Judge Ouderkirk
decided to excuse juror 373 for failing to participate in meaningful
deliberations due either to some sort of illness causing a mental defect,
or to misconduct. 325 Judge Ouderkirk offered three reasons supporting
this determination." 2° First, he noted juror 373's inability to compre-
hend some simple concepts, including basic words such as "and" or
"or.""27 Next, he cited those instances where juror 373 apparently forgot
entire discussions or denied participating in them." 2" Finally, Judge
Ouderkirk explained that he based his determination, in part, on the
fact that any verdict would be unlikely with her presence due to her
lack of willingness or ability to cleliberate." 2" In reaching these conclu-
sions, Judge Ouderkirk relied on the testimony of the three jurors
interviewed and the note submitted on behalf of eleven jurors. 59° Con-
versely, Judge Ouderkirk stated that he did not find juror 373's testi-
mony to be credible." 1 Explaining that his decision was not predicated
on any personality conflicts, or the desire to replace a hold-out juror,
Judge Ouclerkirk concluded that juror 373 failed to deliberate in a
meaningful way and thus had to be discharged.""
Judge Ouderkirk dismissed juror 373 on Monday October 11,
1993, and replaced her with an alternate.'" After informing the jury
of his decision, Judge Ouderkirk instructed them to begin delibera-
tions anew."'" The jury, which had to begin deliberations anew again
225 Transcript at 8209-10, 8212, Williams, No. BA058116. judge Ouderkirk expressly avoided
definitively categorizing juror 373's conduct as deliberate or unintentional. See id. at 8212. He
explained that, regardless of the basis of her failure to deliberate, juror 373 had to be discharged.
Id.
521 Id. at 8216-17.
327 1d. at 8216.
1128 Id.
52g Id. at 8217.
"'Transcript at 8217, Williams, No. BA058116.
"1 M. at 8213.
"2 See id. at 8216-.17.
"3 Id. at 8148, 8219, 8226.
""'Transcript at 8227, Williams, No, BA058116. The court's instructions were as billows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, one of' your number has been excused for legal
cause and replaced with an alternate juror. You must not consider this fact for any
purpose. The people and the defendants have the right to a verdict reached only
after full participation of the twelve jurors who return a verdict. This right may be
assured only if you begin your deliberations again from the beginning. You must
therefore set aside all past deliberations and begin deliberating anew. This means
that each remaining original juror must set aside and disregard the earlier delib-
erations as if they had not taken place. In a moment you shall retire to begin anew
your deliberations with all the instructions previously given.
Id. at 8227-28.
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the very next day due to the discharge of another juror, deliberated
for six more days before returning the verdicts."'
V. POST-SUBMISSION SUBSTITUTION'S EFFECT ON THE SUBSTANTIVE
RICA-ITS OF THE ACCUSED
Judge Ouderkirk's decision to replace juror 373 in Denny illus-
trates the wide discretion exercised by judges at the trial court level
with respect to post-submission substitutions. While statutes allowing
substitution during deliberations serve to protect limited judicial re-
sources, their scope must be limited and trial court judges should be
entrusted with little discretion. Post-submission substitutions add an
outside element to the jury, giving rise to the threat of coercive group
dynamics, which can potentially compromise a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a trial by an impartial jury."' Thus, any statutes spe-
cifically authorizing this practice should carefully limit its application
to specifically designated situations and provide for strict appellate
review procedures.
The recent trend, both in California and in the federal court
system, has resulted in an expansion of the discretion that can be
exercised by lower court judges."' The California Supreme Court, for
instance, endorsed a lower court's expansion of the term "good cause"
to include juror misconduct!"$ Additionally, this court permitted a trial
court to replace a juror with an alternate after a verdict had been
reached on one of two counts."9 Finally, the California Supreme Court
even allowed the trial court to consult with the jury and evoke their
preferences in an effort to determine whether substitution was appro-
priate."" A similar trend has emerged in the federal cowls."' Although
Rule 24(c) prohibits post-submission substitution, some circuits have
allowed the practice under certain circumstances, such as when the
parties stipulate,3A 2 or in the absence of prejudice.TM 3 Thus, in both
jurisdictions, despite clear statutory language, the courts, in their in-
terpretation and application of the statute, have expanded trial court
328 See Dunn & McMillan, supra note 14, at A29.
336 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This amendment provides, in relevant part, that the accused "shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." Id.
337 See supra notes 51-239 and accompanying text.
338 People v. Daniels, 802 P.2d 906, 929 (Cal.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 145 (1991).
"1 ' People v Aikens, 254 Cal. Rptr. 30, 31-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
144)
 People v. Roberts, 825 P.2d 274, 303-04 (Cal. 1992).
'441 See supra notes 51-142 and accompanying text.
342 Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 385 U.S. 802 (1966).




judges' discretion with respect to post-submission substitution proce-
dures."4
In Denny, Judge Ouderkirk exemplified this trend through his
exercise of considerable discretion in replacing juror 373. He concluded
that juror 373 failed to meaningfully deliberate based on, among other
things, instances of alleged forgetfulness and confusion."'''' While juror
373's conduct could be classified as stubborn or annoying, the deter-
mination that it constitutes "good cause" for post-submission substitu-
tion is debatable. Juror 373's testimony could easily lead to the conclu-
sion that she was the lone juror protecting the rights of the defendants.
As argued by defense counsel, juror 373's requests for increased or-
ganization and caution are not factors that normally indicate a failure
to deliberate."" In reaching his decision, however, Judge Ouderkirk
rejected the credibility of juror 373's testimony while accepting the
statements of the other jurors."7 Juror 373's presence may have indeed
frustrated the deliberative process to a point where her dismissal was
proper. Such a determination, however, hardly appears obvious from
the record. Instead, it appears to be the result of Judge Ouderkirk's
desire to remove a stumbling block in an effort to successfully conclude
the litigation.
Allowing lower court judges such broad discretionary power with
respect to post-submission substitutions raises important concerns about
defendants' substantive rights.*"3 The decision to replace a juror during
deliberations interferes with the interactive group dynamic on which
our jury system is based. 349
 Both the federal courts and the California
state courts have noted the importance of personal reactions and
interactions as juries work to reach a consensus."J 0 Post-submission
substitution procedures, however, alter this process, producing several
negative consequences. Alternate jurors, for instance, participate in
only part of the deliberations. Additionally, alternates substituted dur-
ing deliberations are thrust into an inherently coercive atmosphere in
which there is substantial pressure to accept the preconceived conclu-
sions of the jury. 351 Next, broad substitution procedures adversely im-
3+1 See SUPTa notes 51-239 and accompanying text.
4 '5 Transcript at 8216, Williams, No. BA058116.
34H See id. at 8204.
347 Id. at 8216-17.
34H See United Slates v. Lamb, 529 F.2(1 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975),
349 See Lamb, 529 F.2r1 at 1156; People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742, 746 (Cal. 1976), cerl. denied,
429 U.S. 1077 (1977).
35() See Lamb, 529 F.2(1 at 1156; Collins, 552 P.2d at 746.
351 See Lamb, 529 F.2(1 at 1156.
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pact the defendant's right to a hung jury. 3'2 Finally, this practice allows
the jury to become actively involved in their own composition.
The deliberation process centers on the careful consideration and
analysis of evidence by the entire jury after thorough discussion. 555 In
cases like Denny, however, the alternate who joins a panel that has
already spent significant time deliberating misses part of the crucial
deliberative process. While the other jurors are fully aware of each
other's view points and the previously established conclusions, the
alternate is not privy to such information. Thus, the defendants in
Denny were not judged by a jury that deliberated together to unanimity
because the alternates participated in only part of this important process.
Furthermore, the group dynamic element of the deliberative proc-
ess is frustrated when alternates are subject to the inherently coercive
atmosphere of joining a jury that has already agreed to a verdict's"
Studies demonstrate that individuals joining a previously established
body are unable to alter the practices of the group. 555 Research also
indicates that an individual may ignore his or her own perceptions,
even when correct, in favor of the incorrect group consensus due to
the coercive atmosphere."i°' In cases like Denny, therefore, the alternate
is likely to experience pressure, and may eventually succumb to the
preconceived conclusions of the jury, regardless of their accuracy.
Thus, broad substitution powers drastically diminish the free and un-
coerced deliberation process on which the jury system depends to
overcome any individual biases.
Lamb v. United States demonstrated the inherently coercive pres-
sures that accompany post-submission juror substitutions like Denny.•"
The jury in Lamb deliberated for four hours before the alternate
substitution, but took only twenty-nine minutes after a juror was re-
placed to reach a guilty verdict.'" The Ninth Circuit reversed the
conviction, explaining that the alternate clearly succumbed to the
coercive pressure to convict."59
Another case that illustrates the inherently coercive effects which
potentially accompany post-submission alternate substitution is Peek v.
Kemp."m In Peek, the jury had been deliberating for two hours when a
352 See id.
353 See Collins, 742 1).2c1 at 746.
354 See Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156.
355 See Grunat, supra note 48, at 878 n.124.
356 See id. at 878-79 n.125.
357 See Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156.
358 Id. at 1155.
359 Id. at 1156-57.
363 See reek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479,1482 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
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sick member of the panel asked to be discharged.'"' The court dis-
charged the juror and replaced him with an alternate. 362 Shortly after
the replacement, the new jury returned a guilty verdict." The court
later discovered that the sick juror was the lone hold-out voting for an
acquitta1. 364 The situation in Denny paralleled Peek because evidence
surfaced after the fact that juror 373 was, in fact, a dissenting opinion
and possibly the lone bold-out."''`' Eliminating her opinion diminished
the defendants' protection against the biases of the other members of
the panel.
While post-submission substitution interferes with the group dy-
namic and places the alternate in an inherently coercive atmosphere,
this practice also significantly limits the accused's right to a mistrial if
the original jury cannot reach agreement.'" Post-submission substitu-
tion decreases the likelihood of a hung jury in two ways. First, it allows
the jury to effect their own composition in an effort to ensure a verdict.
Second, studies demonstrate that hung juries are more likely when a
lone dissenter, supporting the defendant, receives support for his or
her position early in cleliberations. 367 Alternates who join ongoing de-
liberations miss this opportunity to gain early support, thus decreasing
the probability that they will hold out and cause a mistrial: 4'8 Judge
Ouderkirk's decision to replace juror 373 appeared motivated, in part,
by the desire to avoid a deadlocked jury and to ensure a verdict.""9 It
accomplished this end by removing the dissenting voice and seating
an alternate who had no opportunity to gain the early support critical
for a hold-out juror. As such, this exercise in discretion clearly dimin-
ished the defendants' right to a hung jury if the panel was unable to
reach a decision.
Finally, post-submission substitution allows the jury to become
actively involved in their own composition, and therefore undermines
the free and unfettered deliberation process. Historically, the idea of
earnest and robust debate was considered critical to the success of the
system."''" When juror replacement procedures are broadly exercised,





3(15 See Dunn & McMillan, supra note 14, at A29.
566 See KAL.v1 8c ZEISEL, 3UPTa note 25, at 462-63.
367 See id,
368 See id.
969 Traitscript at 821 7, Williams, No. 11A058116.
970 See 1-EAsTi It ET A1„, supra note 32, at 5.
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juror to feign illness, thus placing the burden of decision on the
alternates" The jury may also approach the court directly, as in Denny,
and attempt to control their own composition. In Denny, the jury's
note may have been motivated by the desire to remove the lone hold-
out. Thus, the protection that generally results from the counterbal-
ancing of a variety of juror biases was threatened by the elimination of
juror 373. The Denny jury may well have sought to eliminate this
dissenting viewpoint in an effort to achieve unanimity.
While post-submission substitution procedures potentially threaten
some of the defendant's substantive rights, this practice has become
more necessary due to the increasing length and complexity of trials
and the substantial costs associated with mistrials. Statutes that author-
ize this procedure should be narrowly tailored and allow trial court
judges little discretion. To protect the rights of the accused, while at
the same time preserving judicial resources, jurisdictions that enact
post-submission substitution procedures should specifically enumerate
the permissible reasons for replacement and limit the judges power to
substitute jurors to those specific situations. Such reasons should be
limited to cases of juror sickness, death, incapacitation or misconduct.
Amorphous phrases such as "good cause," found in section 1089 of the
California Penal Code, should be eliminated to avoid the discretionary
conflicts present in Denny. Additionally, appellate courts reviewing
such replacements should conduct a thorough analysis of the trial
court record, rather than give the trial court judge's decision automatic
deference. Limited post-submission substitution, subject to strict appel-
late review procedures, would effectively balance the competing inter-
ests of individual defendants and the judicial system.
VI. CoNicLusioN
Post-submission substitution procedures endanger the defendant's
substantive right to a trial by an impartial jury and compromise the
sanctity and freedom of the deliberation process. As demonstrated in
Denny, broad substitution procedures allow jurors to control partially
their own composition and in effect replace a dissenting voice to
achieve unanimity. The advent of the lengthy trial, however, combined
with the many costs, both financial and human, associated with re-liti-
gating disputes, creates the need for some limited substitution proce-
dures. In promulgating rules governing post-submission substitution,
legislatures should narrowly tailor these provisions and leave the lower
311 See Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156.
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court judge with little discretionary authority. Ad hoc deviations from
the confines of these rules should constitute reversible error. Such a
procedure would protect the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
defendant while furthering the judicial system's interest in avoiding
mistrials.
DOUGLAS J. MCDERMOTT'
